Separation of Powers Issue

[POC]

>"Failure to do so, violates the Rules of Professional Conduct
>which may subject the attorney to sanction, suspension or
>disbarrment."

All of those sanctions are self-governing actions of the court. Unilateral limitations do not amount to a separation of power. The fact that such regulations are self-imposed seems to indicate the Court recognizes that attorneys who serve as legislators are likely to represent conflicting interests. When an attorney refrains from voting on such grounds, he fails to represent his constituency. If he drops his client, then the client may have divulged information to a legislator that results in a law that harms the client/constituent, that would not have been divulged to a legislator if not for the trust established through attorney/client privilege. The legislaotr is damned if he does, and damned if he doesn't.

Again, thanks for your insight. But, the issue is still troubling.

[socrateaser]

>All of those sanctions are self-governing actions of the
>court. Unilateral limitations do not amount to a separation of
>power.

Yes, they do amount to a separation of power. The legal profession is generally self-regulating, for obvious reasons. The only means of getting around this is for the legislature to amend the State Constitution to include provisions which the Judiciary cannot avoid by striking them down as unconstitutional under state or federal law.

The court will always protect its own powers as "inherent," if those powers are threatened in any substantial way -- which is what you suggest.

You're tilting at windmills, Don Q. This is a dead end.

[POC]

I understand the Court self-governs, just as the other branches self-govern. But, I don't understand how limiting court members' ability to legislate threatens the Court's inherent power to interpret the law? You don't need to reply to that because I'm not Don Q. and this is not really my issue. But, I do have another question that comes to mind:

Q) Earlier you stated that a legislator/atty could be disbarred for voting on a bill with a conflict of interests. Would asking a judge who presides over CS cases to serve on a legislative child support commission, with the purpose of making recommendations to the Legislature create a similar conflict of interests? I thought it was the AG's responsibility to advise the Executive and Legislative Branches about matters for which there may be legal questions.

[socrateaser]

>Q) Earlier you stated that a legislator/atty could be
>disbarred for voting on a bill with a conflict of interests.
>Would asking a judge who presides over CS cases to serve on a
>legislative child support commission, with the purpose of
>making recommendations to the Legislature create a similar
>conflict of interests? I thought it was the AG's
>responsibility to advise the Executive and Legislative
>Branches about matters for which there may be legal questions.

Judges are subject to a different set of rules than are attorneys, although there are many similarities. Generally, a judge can serve as a member of a group involved in matters relating to administration and/or improvement of law. But, if the judge were serving on a committee which was making law that would have a direct effect on cases currently before the judge or reasonably likely to appear in cases before the judge, then that would create the appearance of impropriaty, would likely be viewed as potentially prejudicial to the judge's rulings, and the judge should withdraw from the committee.

If the judge did not withdraw, then a litigant who knew of the conflict could request that the judge disqualify him/herself from the litigant's case where the law under consideration might reasonably affect the outcome of the case.

Framed in this manner, the judge would probably recuse him/herself.

This is the way it's supposed to work in the ivory tower, but, I ain't the judge, so I can't say for certain how it would come out in any particular circumstance.

[POC]

Would it be okay with you if I posted this most recent reply of yours at the Georgians for Child Support Reform (GACSR) website?

[socrateaser]

>Would it be okay with you if I posted this most recent reply
>of yours at the Georgians for Child Support Reform (GACSR)
>website?

Just use the info and state that it came from someone who wished to remain anonymous.

[POC]

>Just use the info and state that it came from someone who
>wished to remain anonymous.

Thank you. I have done exactly that.

[Finnchadh]

>>One of those limitations falls under an aspect of Due
>Process.  
>
>Conclusory. Which one? Discuss.


1.)   Attorneys, as Officers of the Court, are charged by their duty of candor to the Court, to assist the Court in its only function – the determination of the truth; they are held to higher standards than those not admitted beyond the bar of the Court.  By this admission into to the Bar and the recognition by the Court of their participation in the Court process as well as their advocacy for clients; does this call into issue the Separation of Powers?  Please explain your opinion – thank you.

2.)   Court's power to regulate its function limited by Law. Your opinion – explain please – thank you.  

[socrateaser]

>Q) I guess I will work this from the opposite angle, other
>than constitutional offices, which are specifically provided
>for, is there any provision within the Constitution that
>allows for members of the Court (be they considered exercising
>that authority or not) to simultaneously serve in anohter
>branch of the government?

An attorney can give private advice to a private client without simultaneously undertaking the role of a member of another branch.

An attorney is not deemed to be a governmental actor, when engaged in private practice. A state legislator who was also a working prosecuting attorney would violate the separation of powers, because he/she would be undertaking the role of two branches simultaneously.

Otherwise not.

>
>While there is no compelling case before a court that I am
>aware of, the compelling reason to discuss the issue should be
>self-evident. At issue is whether attorneys ought to be
>allowed to craft legislation or carry out laws which they are
>legally authorized to interpret and give advice about.

Ah! "Ought" is a synonym for "should." The question of what "should" or "should" not be, is one for the political process to sort out -- not the courts. Modern, courts deal with what "is," based upon existing legislation, not about what "should" happen.

You're wasting your time with this. No Supreme Court of any jurisdiction is suddenly going to rule that its attorneys can't be legislators. You may as well ask God to step down in favor of Satan.

If you want to change the law in this area, you'll need to do it through the legislative process, not the courts.

[Finnchadh]

This is interesting; I have always been under the impression that an Officer of the Court was given the "Trust" of the Court because they have been charged with an obligation of candor to the Court to assist the Court in the determination of the Truth of the given issue.  While they have a duty to their client, they are ordinarily prevented from placing the interest of the client above the Court's purpose or the Law itself.  Case in point would be Attorney Client privilege is limited to the Lawful Practice of the Law; anything outside that scope is fair game.  No I am not debating the Court's "Responsibility" to regulate the affairs before the Bench to protect its purpose and integrity; however, the powers associated with that responsibility are also limited.  One of those limitations falls under an aspect of Due Process.