Soc isn't this a violation of our.......

[wendl]

Soc-
Isn't this a violation of our freedom of speech

"cannot make derogatory or inflammatory remarks about other parent on or thruough the internet."

Doesn't this violation our right of freedom of speech especially when NO names are being used."



**These are my opinions, they are not legal advice**

[socrateaser]

Maybe...did you challenge the text of the order? If not, then you lost your right to raise the issue as unconstitutional.

I would nee a lot more case-specific facts to analyze your chances, and I'd need to read the ordered text in context, not as a snippet.

[wendl]

Soc-
Brief history
DH filed for custody, went to trial last month, judge felt that since I had my friend talk with bm thru the internet stated "Mrs xx (current wife) participated in inappropriate activities on the internet and spying" (keep in mind bm did the same thing to me and used my opinions posted on sparc against my dhs case, posting on sparc never mentioned bms name etc, just that I felt the court system sucked and our gal suck etc)

BMs atty is trying to get this in the new orders (haven't been signed yet)

VII. Complaince with thsi plan and restraining orders:

7.1 If a parent fails to comply with a provision of this plan, the other parent's obligation under the plan are not affected

7.2 the both parties is/are restrained from the following:
Discussing the proceedings with the children or making derogatory or inflammatory remarks about the other parents to teh chidren ON OR THROUGH THE INTERNET"

DH when going thru this, crossed out the part about the internet when he faxed changes back to his attorney.  

1) would that be considered a violation of our freedom of speech
2) should dh have his attorney request a written objection to this wording in regards to the internet part etc

Thanks for you help, dh goes back to court friday 7/2


**These are my opinions, they are not legal advice**

[socrateaser]

The right to free expression may not generally be restricted except when the affected speech is for "commercial" purposes, or, when the speech contains false assertions of fact about a private person, or where the speech is about a public person, and the speech is "malicious," i.e., made with knowing disregard for the truth. Also, no one is free to incite riot, or criminal behavior, or place others in harm's way by speaking, e.g., you cannot cry "fire" in a crowded theatre.

On your facts, the other attorney is attempting to restrain your husband's right to disparage the other parent and children, even if your disparagements may be true, and even before you say anything. Technically, this is an injunction that is probably unconstitutional, at least as far as you and your husband are concerned. The children, however, are entitled to special protection, and you may be reasonably restrained from creating a hostile environment via your words.

Having said all of this, I would encourage you to read the proposed text carefully. First, it only restrains your husband, not you, because you are not a party to this case or the court order. Second, it doesn't prevent anyone from discussing the proceedings with other adults -- only with the children.

On balance, then, the order is relatively harmless. It is also fairly typical -- most custody orders contain similar language, however, the orders usually cover speech regardless of when and where made, not just on the Internet.

Personally, I'd just shrug it off as a bone to placate the other parent. It really doesn't have much practical value.

[wendl]

Thanks Soc,

That was the exact wording.

We do agree that the nothing should be said to the children regarding the case etc.

However DH does feel he should be able to speak freely to whomever, or on the internet of his opinions as long as names are not posted. The kids are young and would not know how to get on this site UNLESS bm shows them.

We never say anything about bm to the kids ever, the kids will learn the truth later in life on their own.

Thanks for your help.

**These are my opinions, they are not legal advice**

[jilly]

I know this is an older thread and may no longer be relevant but thought you might find this recent decision interesting.

==============================================


Supreme Court of the State of Washington

                            Opinion Information Sheet

Docket Number:       73892-1
Title of Case:       In re the marriage Of: Shawn Suggs and V Andrew O. Hamilton
File Date:           07/08/2004
Oral Argument Date:  02/12/2004


                                SOURCE OF APPEAL
                                ----------------
Appeal from Superior Court,
            County
            Honorable David Russell Draper


                                    JUSTICES
                                    --------
Authored by Mary Fairhurst
Concurring: Faith Ireland
            Barbara A. Madsen
            Bobbe J Bridge
            Charles W. Johnson
            Gerry L Alexander
            Richard B. Sanders
            Susan Owens
            Tom Chambers


                                COUNSEL OF RECORD
                                -----------------
Counsel for Petitioner(s)
            Steven Nash Bogdon
            Attorney at Law
            105 W Evergreen Blvd
            PO Box 1148
            Vancouver, WA  98666-1148

            Aaron Hugh Caplan
            Attorney at Law
            Aclu of Washington
            705 2nd Ave Ste 300
            Seattle, WA  98104-1799

Counsel for Respondent(s)
            John A. Hays
            Attorney at Law
            1402 Broadway St
            Longview, WA  98632-3714

Amicus Curiae on behalf of NORTHWEST WOMEN'S LAW CENTER
            Alice M Ostdiek
            Attorney at Law
            1111 3rd Ave Ste 3400
            Seattle, WA  98101-3264


IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

In the Matter of the Marriage of                 )
SHAWN S. SUGGS,                                  )
                                                 ) No. 73892-1
               Petitioner,                       )
                                                 )
  and                                            )
                                                 ) EN BANC
                                                 )
   ANDREW O. HAMILTON,                           )
                                                 )
Respondent.                                      ) Filed July 8, 2004
                                                 )

FAIRHURST, J. -  The trial court issued an order for protection from
unlawful civil harassment restraining petitioner from "knowingly and
willfully making invalid and unsubstantiated allegations or complaints to
third parties which are designed for the purpose of annoying, harassing,
vexing, or otherwise harming Andrew O. Hamilton and for no lawful purpose."
Clerk's Papers (CP) at 415 (capitalization omitted).  The Court of Appeals
affirmed.  We reverse on the ground that this antiharassment order is an
unconstitutional prior restraint on speech.
I.   FACTS
Five years after their acrimonious dissolution, respondent Andrew Hamilton1
filed a petition for an order for protection (unlawful harassment) against
petitioner Shawn Suggs.  Hamilton's declaration in support of the order
alleged the following 11 incidents he believed constituted unlawful
harassment:2
1.   Suggs' husband informed the Cowlitz County Sheriff that he was
concerned Hamilton would harm Suggs because of his past practice and
because he carried a gun.

2.   Suggs' husband informed the Cowlitz County Prosecutor that he was
concerned Hamilton may harm him and Suggs.

3.   Suggs told the Kelso City Manager that Hamilton was breaking the law
and explained the allegations asserted in the petition for order for
protection3 she filed against Hamilton.

4.   Suggs informed an emergency support shelter that Hamilton was
harassing her and that she needed protection.

5.   Suggs informed the finance department of the Kelso Police Department
that Hamilton had a business license and questioned how a police officer
could have a business license.  She left a voice mail on Hamilton's
business line providing her name and telephone number then left a message
on his home answering machine denying that she left the message on his
business line.

6.   Suggs informed a person at the community action program that she
needed legal aid but first needed to know whether the person she was
speaking with knew Hamilton or his new wife.

7.   Suggs informed the domestic violence unit of the Longview Police
Department that she wanted to file charges against Hamilton because he was
harassing her.

8.   Hamilton believed that Suggs contacted the Federal Bureau of
Investigation about him.

9.   Suggs wrote a letter to the editor of The Daily News suggesting that
Hamilton harassed her.

10.  Suggs sent a letter to Hamilton addressed to "Andrews Hamilton."

11.  A court sanctioned Suggs $500 for violating the parties' parenting
plan and ordered her to pay the sanction via deductions from Hamilton's
monthly child support payments.  Upon receiving the first reduced child
support payment, Suggs contacted the office of support enforcement to
complain.

     The trial court granted Hamilton's petition and permanently restrained
Suggs from "knowingly and willfully making invalid and unsubstantiated
allegations or complaints to third parties which are designed for the
purpose of annoying, harassing, vexing, or otherwise harming Andrew O.
Hamilton and for no lawful purpose."  Id. at 415 (capitalization omitted).
The trial court denied Suggs' motion for reconsideration.
Suggs appealed, alleging that the antiharassment order was an
unconstitutional prior restraint on speech, Hamilton failed to prove
unlawful harassment by a preponderance of the evidence, Hamilton did not
suffer actual substantial emotional distress, the trial court erred in
making the antiharassment order permanent, and she was entitled to immunity
and fees.  Suggs v. Hamilton, noted at 116 Wn. App. 1016, 2003 WL 1298665,
at **4-5, 7-8 (2003).  The Court of Appeals affirmed the antiharassment
order and denied immunity and fees in an unpublished decision.  Id. at **4,
8.  It held that the antiharassment order was a constitutional prior
restraint because it restrained unprotected libelous speech.  Id. at **4-5.
We granted the petition for review.  Suggs v. Hamilton, 150 Wn.2d 1009, 79
P.3d 446 (2003).
II.  ISSUE
Is the antiharassment order an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech?
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
     This court reviews constitutional challenges de novo.  Shoop v.
Kittitas County, 149 Wn.2d 29, 33, 65 P.3d 1194 (2003).
IV.  ANALYSIS
     Chapter 10.14 RCW prohibits unlawful harassment.  "`Unlawful
harassment'" is "a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a
specific person which seriously alarms, annoys, harasses, or is detrimental
to such person, and which serves no legitimate or lawful purpose."  RCW
10.14.020(1).  Although "`(c)ourse of conduct'" includes "any other form of
communication, contact, or conduct," "(c)onstitutionally protected
activity" is not within its ambit.  RCW 10.14.020(2).    Moreover, the
harassment chapter may not be used "to infringe upon any constitutionally
protected rights including, . . . freedom of speech."  RCW 10.14.190.
Suggs contends that the antiharassment order violates her freedom of speech
because it is an unconstitutional prior restraint.  In doing so, she argues
that article I, section 5 of the Washington Constitution provides greater
protection against prior restraints than the first amendment to the United
States Constitution.  Article I, section 5, prohibits prior restraints
against protected speech but permits prior restraints against unprotected
speech.  State v. Coe, 101 Wn.2d 364, 374, 679 P.2d 353 (1984).  Whether
our state constitution affords greater protection to the sort of speech
restrained by the antiharassment order is determined by the factors
enumerated in State v. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d 54, 720 P.2d 808 (1986).  Ino
Ino, Inc. v. City of Bellevue, 132 Wn.2d 103, 114-15, 937 P.2d 154, 943
P.2d 1358 (1997) (citing Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d at 58).  Where, as here, the
parties failed to brief the Gunwall factors, this court will not consider a
claim that our state constitution affords greater protection.  State v.
Dhaliwal, 150 Wn.2d 559, 575-76, 79 P.3d 432 (2003).4
     Accordingly, we turn to federal case law to determine whether the
antiharassment order is an unconstitutional prior restraint.  The United
States Supreme Court defines prior restraints as
     `(A)dministrative and judicial orders forbidding certain
communications when issued in advance of the time that such communications
are to occur.' M(elville B.) Nimmer, Nimmer on Freedom of Speech(: A
Treatise on the Theory of the First Amendment) sec. 4.03, p. 4-14 (1984). .
. .  Temporary restraining orders and permanent injunctions--i.e., court
orders that actually forbid speech activities--are classic examples of
prior restraints.

Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550, 113 S. Ct. 2766, 125 L. Ed.
2d 441 (1993).  This antiharassment order is a prior restraint because it
forbids Suggs' speech before it occurs; it forbids her from "knowingly and
willfully making invalid and unsubstantiated allegations or complaints to
third parties which are designed for the purpose of annoying, harassing,
vexing, or otherwise harming Andrew O. Hamilton and for no lawful purpose."
CP at 415 (capitalization omitted).
     Prior restraints carry a heavy presumption of unconstitutionality.
Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70, 83 S. Ct. 631, 9 L. Ed. 2d
584 (1963).  In Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 51 S. Ct.
625, 75 L. Ed. 1357 (1931) the United States Supreme Court declared that
prior restraints are permissible only in exceptional cases such as war,
obscenity, and "incitements to acts of violence and the overthrow by force
of orderly government."  283 U.S. at 716.
The Court revisited prior restraint in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568, 62 S. Ct. 766, 86 L. Ed. 1031 (1942).  The trial court found
Chaplinsky guilty of violating a state statute prohibiting persons from
uttering offensive, derisive or annoying words, calling another person
offensive or derisive names, or making any noise or exclamation in
another's "`presence and hearing with intent to deride, offend or annoy
him, or to prevent him from pursuing his lawful business or occupation.'"
Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 569 (quoting 1926 N.H. Laws, ch. 378, sec. 2).
Chaplinsky argued that the statute was an unreasonable restraint on his
freedom of speech.  Id.  The Court disagreed, finding that the statute
prohibits fighting words--words that are not protected by the First
Amendment.  Id. at 573.  In dicta, the Court provided a laundry list of
"certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the
prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any
Constitutional problem" that may be subject to prior restraint.  Id.  at
571-72.  Included in the list was libelous, lewd, and obscene speech.  Id.
Hamilton successfully argued to the Court of Appeals that this
antiharassment order is a constitutional prior restraint because it
restrains libelous speech--speech included in the Chaplinsky list.  Suggs,
2003 WL 1298665, at *5.  In doing so, both Hamilton and the Court of
Appeals cite a footnote from a Washington Court of Appeals decision
explaining that "(l)ibelous speech is not protected and, therefore, may be
a basis for an antiharassment order."  State v. Noah, 103 Wn. App. 29, 39
n.1, 9 P.3d 858 (2000).
Reliance on this footnote statement is misplaced for four reasons.  First,
Noah itself acknowledged that the statement was dicta; the statement is
immediately followed with "(n)onetheless, we will exclude it from our
consideration."  Id.  Second, unlike the current case, the plaintiff in
Noah also filed a defamation suit for damages.  Id. at 37.  Third, the Noah
reasoning conflicts with the footnote because the reasoning focuses on the
contact between the victim and the perpetrator and explains that no contact
orders are "narrowly tailored by focus(ing) on the victim and a no-contact
zone around the victim.  It leaves open ample alternative channels of
communications, by leaving open every alternative channel so long as no
contact is made with the victim and the proscribed zone is not violated."
Id. at 41-42.  Fourth, and most importantly, we cannot be certain that the
antiharassment order in this case restrains libelous speech.
Labeling certain types of speech "unprotected" is easy.  Determining
whether specific instances of speech actually fall within "unprotected"
areas of speech is much more difficult.  The United States Supreme Court
has repeatedly noted that the line between protected and unprotected speech
is very fine.  In Carroll v. President & Commissioners of Princess Anne,
393 U.S. 175, 183, 89 S. Ct. 347, 21 L. Ed. 2d 325 (1968), for example, the
Court stated:
An order issued in the area of First Amendment rights must be couched in
the narrowest terms that will accomplish the pin-pointed objective
permitted by constitutional mandate and the essential needs of the public
order.  In this sensitive field, the State may not employ "means that
broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more
narrowly achieved."  Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488(,81 S. Ct. 247, 5
L. Ed. 2d 231 (1960)).   In other words, the order must be tailored as
precisely as possible to the exact needs of the case.

See also Southeastern Promotions, Ltd.  v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 559, 95 S.
Ct. 1239, 43 L. Ed. 2d 448 (1975) ("It is always difficult to know in
advance what an individual will say, and the line between legitimate and
illegitimate speech is often so finely drawn that the risks of freewheeling
censorship are formidable.").
     This antiharassment order very generally forbids Suggs from "knowingly
and willfully making invalid and unsubstantiated allegations or complaints
to third parties which are designed for the purpose of annoying, harassing,
vexing, or otherwise harming Andrew O. Hamilton and for no lawful purpose."
CP at 415 (capitalization omitted).  Our consideration of what type of
speech the order restrains yields three options.  Initially, the phrase
"invalid and unsubstantiated complaints to third parties" makes it appear
as if the order restrains libelous speech.  Id.  Second, the phrase
"designed for the purpose of annoying, harassing, vexing, or otherwise
harming Andrew O. Hamilton and for no lawful purpose" makes it appear as if
the order restrains harassing speech.  Id.  Finally, the combination of the
two phrases--"invalid and unsubstantiated complaints to third parties" and
"designed for the purpose of annoying, harassing, vexing, or otherwise
harming Andrew O. Hamilton and for no lawful purpose"--makes it appear as
if the order restrains "harassment via libel," a unique hybrid of both
harassing and libelous speech.   Id.
     This confusion leads us to conclude that the antiharassment order is
an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech because it lacks the
specificity demanded by the United States Supreme Court for prior restraint
on unprotected speech.  Indefinite wording is impermissible when the Court
has repeatedly stated that the line between protected and unprotected
speech is very fine.  Such wording leaves us unable to ascertain what
speech the order actually prohibits.  Moreover, it leaves Suggs with an
order chilling all of her speech about Hamilton because it is unclear what
she can and cannot say.  Chilling is intolerable in the first amendment
context and is exacerbated by the fact that many of the incidents that
Hamilton based his antiharassment order on pertain to the efforts of Suggs
and her husband to address what they perceive is Hamilton's harassment.
     We can conceive of circumstances where a trial court could draft a
constitutionally sound antiharassment order restraining the speech that
appears implicated in the order here.  For example, the trial court could
have restrained Suggs from making specific allegations that were either
adjudicated or admitted to be false.  It could have specifically ordered
that Suggs cannot allege that Hamilton molested their daughter during the
dates involved in the previous allegations because Suggs conceded that
Hamilton did not molest their daughter.  It could have specifically ordered
that Suggs cannot allege that Hamilton stole her cellular telephone during
the dates involved in the previous allegations because Hamilton helped
arrest the person who actually stole it.  Such restrictions would pass
constitutional muster because they restrain specific speech that has been
determined false.  As a result, such restrictions would operate as a
constitutionally sound post-speech restraint rather than a constitutionally
infirm prior restraint.
     However, the above circumstances are not present here.  This
antiharassment order does not have such specificity.  The order's "invalid
and unsubstantiated" language is particularly problematic in this context
because what may appear valid and substantiated to Suggs may ultimately be
found invalid and unsubstantiated by a court.  Id.  Fearful of what
allegations may or may not ultimately be deemed invalid and
unsubstantiated, Suggs may be hesitant to assert any allegations, including
those she deems truthful.  As a result, even her protected speech would be
chilled.
V.   CONCLUSION
   We find that the antiharassment order is an unconstitutional prior
restraint on speech.  We reverse the Court of Appeals and vacate the order.5

                    WE CONCUR:

1 Hamilton is a fully commissioned police officer with the Kelso Police
Department.
2 Hamilton also alleged six incidents dating back to the parties'
separation "not for the purpose of supporting the actions for the current
anti-harassment order but rather to let the court know that these are not
isolated events.  These have been a series of historical, ongoing events."
CP at 3.  One of those allegations was that Suggs informed the chief and a
lieutenant of the Kelso Police Department and the captain of the Longview
Police Department that Hamilton was sexually molesting the parties'
daughter, although Suggs later admitted that Hamilton had not molested
their daughter.  Suggs also accused Hamilton of stealing her cellular
telephone, although Hamilton assisted the police in arresting the person
who stole it.
3  Suggs filed a petition for order for protection before and after
Hamilton filed his petition for an order for protection (unlawful
harassment).  Suggs' declaration supporting the order alleged that an on-
duty and armed Hamilton recklessly pursued Suggs in his large sport utility
vehicle after she picked up their children from school in her small compact
vehicle.  It also noted that Hamilton repeatedly came to her home
unannounced and uninvited and that Hamilton exhibited anger toward her on
numerous occasions.
     4 This court previously stated that City of Seattle v. Huff, 111 Wn.2d
923, 767 P.2d 572 (1989), held that article I, section 5 does not provide
additional protection to harassing speech in nonpublic forums and that
Richmond v. Thompson held that article I, section 5 does not provide any
additional protection for defamatory speech.  Ino Ino, 132 Wn.2d at 116
(citing Huff, 111 Wn.2d at 926; Richmond v. Thompson, 130 Wn.2d 368, 382,
922 P.2d 1343 (1996)).  We cannot rely on Huff or Richmond.  As discussed
below, we are unable to determine what type of speech this antiharassment
order actually restrains.  Moreover, the forum analysis of Huff does not
apply and Richmond focused on article I, section 4 (the petition clause),
not article I, section 5.  Huff, 111 Wn.2d at 926-28; Richmond, 130 Wn.2d
at 379-82.
5 Because we resolve this case on constitutional grounds, we do not discuss
the remaining challenges raised by Suggs other than to note that specific
findings of fact on each of the legitimate or lawful purpose factors
enumerated in RCW 10.14.030 are helpful on review.  In addition, the
argument that Suggs is immune from harassment under former RCW 4.24.510
(1999) is procedurally barred because she raised such immunity before the
Court of Appeals in her motion for reconsideration but failed to challenge
the denial of her motion for reconsideration in her petition for review.
RAP 2.4(c).

[wendl]

Thanks,
BM is just pissed cuz she was stupid enough to talk to my friend via instant messenger, haha she validated everything to my friend that we  had been telling our atty.

This all occurred because I post my opinions here and they were stalking me, dh never posts online.

So in reality no biggie as his court orders say nothing about me being online, PLUS I don't use bms name or his childrens names here.

Just stupid and peddy people ya know what I mean, BM and her friends have nothing better to do than stalk me on the site I frequent.
:):)
**These are my opinions, they are not legal advice**

[socrateaser]

.